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ABSTRACT
Human parainfluenza virus type 3 (hPIV3) infections cause considerable morbidity and mortality after stem cell
transplantation, and inpatient nosocomial outbreaks are common. From September 1998 to July 1999, 93 stem
cell transplantation recipients at our institution contracted hPIV3, of which 66 (71%) were being followed up
in our outpatient department (OPD). The peak incidence was in September and October, when 39 cases were
identified; thereafter, hPIV3 incidence decreased to approximately 5 cases per month. Nucleotide sequences
(778 nucleotides from variable regions of the hemagglutinin-neuraminidase gene) from 46 patient and 8
community hPIV3 isolates were compared to determine epidemiologic relatedness. Sequence analysis of OPD
isolates revealed that 18 of 19 isolates from September and October and 11 of 15 isolates from November 1998
to July 1999 were genetically similar. In contrast, 2 of 3 community isolates from September and October and
0 of 5 from November to July were linked to this cluster. Symptomatic surveillance and isolation were
ineffective in terminating the outbreak, suggesting asymptomatic shedding among patients, staff, or visitors or
viral persistence on environmental surfaces as possible explanations. The concept of nosocomial transmission
should be expanded to include the OPD for immunosuppressed patients.
© 2004 American Society for Blood and Marrow Transplantation
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tNTRODUCTION
Community-acquired respiratory virus infections
uch as human parainﬂuenza virus type 3 (hPIV3) are
igniﬁcant causes of morbidity and mortality after
tem cell transplantation (SCT) [1-4]. The epidemi-
logy of hPIV3 infection after SCT is different from
hat associated with latent endogenous viral infections
such as herpes simplex or cytomegalovirus infec-
ions), in which patient serostatus and degree of im-
unosuppression drive the occurrence of disease.
ather, the acquisition of hPIV3 infections seems to
e independent of immunosuppression or transplant o
8ype [4] and is driven primarily by patient exposure to
he virus during periods of heightened community-
ide activity. Thus, infection control procedures play
critical role in preventing hPIV3 infections in the
mmunocompromised host.
Despite heightened awareness of and improved
nfection control practices for the prevention of com-
unity-acquired respiratory virus infections in these
atients, nosocomial outbreaks of hPIV3 infections
ithin SCT units have documented the efﬁciency by
hich these viruses may be transmitted in closed set-
ings [5,6]. At our institution, most cases seem to
ccur among outpatients who freely circulate within
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Bhe community, rather than among inpatients [4]. We
ecently experienced a prolonged outbreak of hPIV3
nfection in our outpatient department (OPD) over an
1-month period despite intensive infection-control
ractices. Molecular typing of viral isolates from the
utbreak and surrounding community was used to
etermine whether this outbreak was due to ongoing
ransmission of a single strain within our outpatient
linic or multiple introductions of virus from the cir-
ulating community pool.
ATIENTS AND METHODS
atient Population and Setting
The Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center is
large referral stem cell transplant center in Seattle,
A. Conditioning for stem cell transplant recipients
7-9], prophylaxis [10,11], and treatment [10] of graft-
ersus-host disease were performed as previously de-
cribed. Stem cell transplant recipients were generally
reated as inpatients from the start of transplant-con-
itioning therapy until recovery from neutropenia.
hereafter, they were followed up at least twice
eekly in the OPD until approximately 100 days after
ransplantation, when they were returned to the care
f their referring physician. Inpatients were housed in
of 3 transplant-dedicated wards (9SW, 10SW, and
1SW) in individual rooms with positive pressure with
espect to the hallway and either high-efﬁciency par-
iculate air–ﬁltered air or 95% air ﬁltration. Outpa-
ients were treated in a dedicated clinic across the
treet from the hospital. This clinic consisted of a
arge common waiting room, from which patients
ere taken to individual examination rooms with pos-
tive pressure with respect to the hallway (but without
igh-efﬁciency particulate air–ﬁltered air). This study
as approved by the Institutional Review Board at the
red Hutchinson Cancer Research Center.
irology Procedures and Definition of hPIV3
nfection
A nasopharyngeal-throat wash or swab and throat
wab for viral testing was performed for all patients
ith upper respiratory tract symptoms throughout the
tudy period; testing consisted of direct ﬂuorescent
ntibody (DFA; Bartels VRK; Intracel, Issaquah, WA)
taining for the community-acquired respiratory vi-
uses (respiratory syncytial virus [RSV], inﬂuenza A
nd B, and the parainﬂuenza viruses), shell vial testing
or RSV, and viral culture. Viral DFA and culture
ere also performed on all bronchoalveolar lavage,
ung biopsy, and autopsy specimens. Specimens for
espiratory virus cultures were inoculated into tissue
ultures containing rhesus monkey kidney, human
oreskin ﬁbroblasts, and A-549 cells. Upper respira-
ory cultures were kept for 10 days before negative W
B&MTesults were reported; lower respiratory tract cultures
ere kept for at least 21 days. Hemadsorption was
erformed on day 2 or 3, day 5, and day 10; conﬁr-
ation was based on type-speciﬁc ﬂuorescent anti-
ody staining (Bartels VRK; Intracel), as well as the
ositive hemadsorption test. Isolates were subse-
uently stored at 20°C until molecular analysis was
erformed.
Hospital ward–acquired hPIV3 infections were
eﬁned as DFA or culture positivity occurring 4
ays after admission to one of the inpatient wards [12].
uman PIV3 infections detected while the patient
as in the OPD or within 4 days of hospitalization
ere deemed to have been contracted in the OPD.
nfection-Control Measures
Multimodal infection-control measures were in
lace throughout the study period. All health-care
orkers, patients, and visitors were required to sign in
tating that they did not have cough, sneezing, or
ncontrolled rhinorrhea before gaining access to in-
atient wards or the OPD. Staff members with these
ymptoms were restricted from patient care, and
ymptomatic visitors were prohibited access. Symp-
omatic inpatients and outpatients underwent viro-
ogic testing of nasopharyngeal wash specimens as
iscussed previously; both inpatients and outpatients
ere placed in respiratory isolation in individual
ooms until they were both asymptomatic and culture
egative for respiratory viruses. Isolation rooms were
quipped with dedicated stethoscopes and other
quipment, and visitors and workers were required to
ear gowns, gloves, and masks with eye protection
efore entering isolation rooms. All health-care work-
rs were required to wash their hands before and after
ll routine patient contact (both in the context of
solation and during routine care); no gloves, gowns,
r masks were required for contact with patients who
ere not in isolation. All inpatient rooms (both for
solated patients and those receiving general care)
ere cleaned daily with a quaternary ammonia germi-
ide. In the outpatient examination and treatment
ooms, all surfaces and equipment were cleaned thor-
ughly between patients by using alcohol and quater-
ary ammonia–impregnated wipes.
everse Transcription-Polymerase Chain
eaction, DNA Sequencing, and Nucleotide
equence Analysis
Reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction
nd DNA sequencing were performed at the Centers
or Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on 46
atient hPIV3 isolates by using previously described
ethods [6]. Human PIV3 isolates that were obtained
rom respiratory specimens sent to the University of
ashington from the general Seattle community dur-
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6ng the same period were also sequenced as controls.
rieﬂy, variable regions of the hemagglutinin-neur-
minidase (HN) gene totaling 778 nucleotides (nt;
egions 1 to 424 and 1535 to 1888; nt numbering by
an Wyke Coelingh et al. [13]) were sequenced for
ach isolate, and nt alignments were prepared with the
rogram PileUp (Wisconsin Package, version 10.1;
ccelrys, San Diego, CA). Sequencing was performed
n both directions on original isolates by using a high-
delity DNA polymerase (Herculase Enhanced DNA
olymerase; Stratagene, La Jolla, CA), and selected
solates were resequenced from new RNA extracts to
onﬁrm results. Phylogenetic analysis was performed
y 3 different methods—maximum parsimony, dis-
ance, and maximum likelihood—by using the soft-
are program PAUP (version 4.0; Sinauer Associates,
underland, MA). The CDC was blinded to patient
ata until after sequence analysis was performed.
ESULTS
uman PIV3 Outbreak: Characteristics
From September 1998 to July 1999, 93 cases of
PIV3 infection were documented in recipients of
tem cell transplants at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer
esearch Center. Of these, 66 cases (71%) were ac-
uired in our OPD (Table 1); these infections oc-
urred among 397 patients who attended the OPD
uring the 11-month period (attack rate, 17%). The
utbreak was ﬁrst recognized in September and Oc-
ober (hereafter designated the outbreak period),
hen 30 outpatients and 9 inpatients contracted
PIV3 infection. The temporal relationship of our
PIV3 outbreak to the community-wide prevalence of
PIV3 (as determined from data obtained from the
ational Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance
ystem, CDC, for the Seattle/King County area) is
hown in Figure 1. These data demonstrate that the
utbreak occurred without a concomitant increase in
PIV3 infections in the community.
In response to the outbreak, the infection-control
able 1. Outbreak of Human Parainﬂuenza Type 3 in a Stem Cell
ransplant Population, According to Patient Location at the Time
f Infection
Time
Ward (No. Cases)
OPD 9SW 10SW 11SW
eptember to October 1998 30 2 2 5
ovember to December 1998 8 0 1 0
anuary to February 1999 7 0 3 1
arch to April 1999 3 1 2 1
ay to July 1999 18 3 3 3
otal 66 6 11 10
PD indicates outpatient department; 9SW, 10SW, 11SW, inpa-
tient wards.easures outlined in Patients and Methods were re- c
0nforced, and compliance was veriﬁed by infection
ontrol staff members; this was followed by a decline
n the incidence of hPIV3 infection to approximately
cases per month (hereafter designated the postout-
reak period). Given the ongoing prevalence of hPIV3
nfection within Seattle, these infections were inter-
reted at the time as infections that were contracted
rom outside contacts with the community at large,
ather than from a continued cycle of nosocomial
ransmission.
olecular Analysis
Of the 93 cases of hPIV3 infection that occurred
uring the study period, 46 isolates (representing 49%
f cases) were recovered and submitted for sequencing
nd molecular analysis. Isolates analyzed included 34
49%) of 66 from patients who contracted hPIV3 in
he OPD and 12 (44%) of 27 hPIV3 isolates from
atients who had inpatient nosocomial infections. In
ddition, 8 archived hPIV3 isolates that were obtained
rom samples submitted to the Virology Laboratory at
he Seattle Children’s Hospital and Regional Medical
enter were recovered and analyzed as community
ontrols. The estimated maximum parsimony tree ob-
ained from alignment of hPIV3 HN gene sequences
f case and control isolates is shown in Figure 2.
As shown in Figure 2, the vast majority of case
solates sequenced (36 isolates of 46 tested; 78%) fell
nto a distinctive cluster (hereafter termed cluster 1),
upported by a high bootstrap value of 99%. Within
luster 1, case isolates differed by 3 or fewer nt, and 27
solates shared identical sequences. Two control iso-
ates from the surrounding community also grouped
ithin this cluster. Three other clusters of case iso-
ates supported by bootstrap values of80% were also
een. Cluster 2 contained 4 isolates that differed from
ach other by 2 to 6 nt and had lower bootstrap
upport (83%) than cluster 1. Clusters 3 and 4 each
ad bootstrap support of 98%, and each contained 2
solates that differed from each other by a single nt.
he 8 community control isolates were genetically
igure 1. Human PIV3 outbreak at a stem cell transplant (SCT)
enter and relationship to community-wide prevalence.
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Biverse: the 2 most closely related sequences differed
y 8 nt.
Table 2 shows the proportion of isolates from
luster 1 for both the outbreak and postoutbreak pe-
iod according to patient location at the time of in-
ection. As expected, most isolates from the outbreak
eriod (23/24; 96%) shared closely related sequences
nd were grouped within cluster 1; these included 18
95%) of 19 isolates tested from patients attending the
PD and 5 of 5 isolates from patients on the inpatient
ards. In addition, 2 of the 3 community isolates
controls 2 and 6) from the outbreak period fell within
luster 1. Strikingly, 11 (73%) of 15 isolates from the
PD that were obtained from the postoutbreak pe-
iod still fell within cluster 1, despite the apparent
isappearance of isolates from this cluster in the com-
unity at large (0 of 5 tested). Isolates from cluster 1
ere detected in OPD patients in November (n  1),
ecember (n 2), January (n 4), April (n 1), May
n  2), and June (n  1), suggesting a cycle of
igure 2. Estimated maximum parsimony tree obtained from align-
ent of partial hPIV3 hemagglutinin-neuraminidase gene se-
uences (778 nt) from 46 cases and 8 community control patients.
enetic distances between sequences are shown as the number of
iffering nucleotides; bootstrap values for 100 iterations are indi-
ated for selected nodes.ngoing nosocomial transmission; genetically distinct
B&MTommunity controls were obtained from December,
arch, April, and May (Table 2).
Isolates from cluster 2 did not seem to be tightly
inked in time or place. Two isolates were recovered
rom patients in the OPD, but these were 3 months
part (case 35 in March and case 45 in June); the
emaining 2 isolates were recovered from different
ards at different times (case 32, 10SW in February;
ase 41, 9SW in May). Two isolates from cluster 3
cases 33 and 34) did seem to be spatially and tempo-
ally linked, however, because both were recovered
rom patients on 10SW in late February and early
arch, respectively. Two isolates from cluster 4 (cases
8 and 40) were linked in time (both recovered within
week of each other in May) but not place (recovered
n 9SW and the OPD, respectively). A control isolate
control 4) that grouped with these cases was obtained
rom an immunocompetent child from Seattle in May.
wo case isolate sequences (cases 8 and 46) did not
eem to be closely related to sequences from any of the
ther case isolates.
pidemiologic Analysis
An intensive prospective investigation of transmis-
ion patterns was undertaken during the outbreak pe-
iod in September and October. Despite patient, fam-
ly, and staff interviews and extensive chart review, no
onsistent pattern of exposure was noted (with the
xception of OPD attendance for outpatients). Specif-
cally, there were no consistent patterns with regard to
ealth-care worker exposure (including physicians,
urses, physical therapists, occupational therapists,
haplains, and nutritionists), examination room or in-
atient room attendance, visits to radiology or other
ites, contact with symptomatic individuals, or place of
esidence (data not shown). Retrospective epidemio-
ogic analysis was conducted for patients in the post-
utbreak period who were linked by molecular char-
cterization of their isolates; again, no chains of
ransmission could be discerned.
able 2. Molecular Analysis of hPIV3 Isolates: Proportion of Isolates
n Cluster 1 According to Patient Location and Time Period
Ward/Cohort
No. of Isolates from Cluster 1/
No. of Isolates Tested
Outbreak
Period
(September to
October 1998)
Postoutbreak
Period
(November 1998 to
July 1999)
PD 18/19 (95%) 11/15 (73%)
SW 1/1 1/3 (33%)
0SW 1/1 1/4 (25%)
1SW 3/3 0/0
ommunity control 2/3 (67%) 0/5
PD indicates outpatient department; 9SW, 10SW, 11SW, inpa-
tient wards.
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6ISCUSSION
Molecular analysis of viral isolates obtained during
prolonged outbreak of hPIV3 infections among stem
ell transplant recipients at our institution suggested
hat this outbreak was associated with a single pre-
ominant genotype (cluster 1). Although the ﬁnding
f related isolates during the outbreak period was
xpected, we have demonstrated that the persistent,
ow-level incidence of hPIV3 infections in the post-
utbreak period was also primarily due to isolates
haring the same common genotype, suggesting a
ontinuing cycle of nosocomial transmission. That
his cycle of transmission occurred in an outpatient
etting despite a relatively strict infection control pol-
cy is a cause for concern.
Molecular analysis offers a powerful tool for epi-
emiologic studies and has been used to support in-
estigations of outbreaks of hPIV3 infection [5,6,14].
arron et al. [14] compared partial sequences (167 nt)
f the 5 noncoding leader region of the fusion protein
ene of hPIV3 isolates obtained during an outbreak of
espiratory illness in a pediatric intermediate care unit
ICU) that occurred over a 3-month period. Se-
uences obtained from 6 children who occupied the
CU differed by 2 nt, whereas sequences acquired
rom community isolates or isolates from other hos-
ital sites were genetically diverse; this supported the
uthors’ conclusion that nosocomial transmission of
PIV3 occurred within the unit. Zambon et al. [5]
nalyzed sequences of 5 noncoding and partial coding
egions (237 nt) from the fusion protein gene of
PIV3 isolates obtained from 13 bone marrow trans-
lant (BMT) patients during 2 consecutive outbreaks
f respiratory illness in a hospital adult BMT unit;
hese isolates were also compared with those of 15
ommunity controls. In the ﬁrst outbreak, sequence
omparisons conﬁrmed multiple introductions of ge-
etically distinct viruses with subsequent nosocomial
ransmission of a single genotype. A second outbreak
hat occurred the following season was associated with
single genotype that was closely related to a geno-
ype that circulated in the preceding outbreak. Pro-
onged shedding of hPIV3 (from weeks to up to 4
onths) was shown in several BMT patients, from
hom serial isolates with identical sequences were
dentiﬁed. More recently, Cortez et al. [6] compared
equences of the HN gene open reading frame (1719
t) from 12 SCT recipients attending an outpatient
linic over an 11-week period. Epidemiologic evi-
ence initially suggested that the outbreak resulted
rom a single introduction of virus that spread be-
ween temporally related cases. However, molecular
nalysis revealed that the outbreak was composed of
ultiple community-acquired infections.
The clusters of hPIV3 case isolates that were iden-iﬁed in our study were deﬁned by similarity of vari- s
2ble regions of the hPIV3 HN gene [13] (778 nt) and
isually represented by a maximum parsimony tree
nearly identical trees were also obtained by distance
nd maximum-likelihood methods). On the basis of
he high bootstrap value for cluster 1 (99%) and the
igh degree of sequence similarity among case isolates
omprising this cluster (0 to 3 nt differences), we
oncluded that these sequences were highly related or
ad a high probability of being in the same lineage
rom a common ancestor. Although randomly selected
solates obtained during the same time frame from
nrelated community controls exhibited much greater
ntersequence variability (the 2 most closely related
ontrol sequences differed by 8 nt), 2 control se-
uences from the SCT outbreak period did group
ith the cluster 1 sequences. Thus, it seems that
iruses identical or similar to those represented in
luster 1 were circulating in the community during the
utbreak period. This was expected, because nosoco-
ial hPIV3 outbreaks must start from a community
ntroduction. In the postoutbreak period, however,
luster 1 sequences were found among 73% of outpa-
ient cases, but not in the 5 community controls that
ere available for testing. The small number of avail-
ble community controls limits our ability to draw
rm conclusions; nevertheless, we believe that the
equence analysis supports the presence of ongoing
osocomial transmission rather than multiple intro-
uctions from the circulating community pool.
Despite these ﬁndings, we were unable to pinpoint
he precise mode of transmission in either the out-
reak or postoutbreak period, which highlights the
imitations of retrospective molecular analysis. Never-
heless, certain mechanisms of transmission can prob-
bly be ruled out. As discussed previously, we believe
hat multiple introductions from the community pool
re unlikely to account for our ﬁndings. In addition,
ecause symptomatic patients were isolated until all
ymptoms resolved and weekly surveillance cultures
ere negative, it is also unlikely that patients who
ere known to be infected accounted for continued
ransmission. Asymptomatic upper respiratory tract
iral infection among stem cell transplant patients is
heoretically possible and has been reported in the
ase of RSV [15]; these asymptomatic shedders could
scape our surveillance mechanism (which is based on
ymptoms) and transmit the virus to others. However,
lthough the immunocompromised host can shed
PIV3 for long periods of time after symptomatic
nfection, subclinical hPIV3 infection (ie, infection
ithout clinical symptoms) has not been previously
ocumented in stem cell transplant recipients [16].
Given that hPIV3 infections are thought to spread
rimarily via large droplets and self-inoculation of
nfectious secretions into the eyes and nose [17], more
ikely explanations for our ﬁndings include transmis-
ion via hPIV3 environmental contamination or trans-
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Bission from asymptomatic health-care workers or
amily members; the latter possibility includes “ping-
ong” infections from patients to health-care workers
nd back. With regard to the former, it has been
hown that hPIV may persist for longer than 10 hours
n nonabsorptive surfaces such as countertops [18];
ndeed, hPIV may persist on such surfaces for weeks
ithout proper decontamination (C.B. Hall, Univer-
ity of Rochester Medical Center, personal communi-
ation, 2003). Because OPD waiting rooms may not
eceive the same attention as do examination rooms, it
s possible that these sites formed the epicenter of our
pidemic. Perhaps more intriguing, however, is the
ossibility of transmission via close contact with
symptomatic or mildly symptomatic health-care
orkers. Since the implementation of our sign-in pol-
cy (wherein health-care workers must attest to being
ree of symptoms consistent with acute respiratory
irus infection before starting work), we have noted a
triking decline in the incidence of RSV infections
mong our patient population [1]. Given that RSV
nfection in normal adults frequently leads to symp-
oms (and absence from work even without mandatory
estrictions) [19], our policy seems to have had its
ntended effect. Experimental inoculation of healthy
dults with hPIV3, however, has shown that this virus
ay be frequently isolated days after inoculation even
n subjects who never develop symptoms [20]; longi-
udinal studies of natural infection in healthy children
nd adults have also revealed that hPIV may be
resent in respiratory secretions without associated
ymptoms [21,22]. These ﬁndings raise the possibility
f hierarchical symptomatology for community-ac-
uired respiratory viruses in the normal adult host.
ndeed, we hypothesize that health-care workers may
eport to work more often with hPIV3 than with RSV
r inﬂuenza; as a result, symptom-based infection-
ontrol strategies that are successful for RSV or inﬂu-
nza may be less effective for the prevention of nos-
comial hPIV3.
In conclusion, molecular sequencing of hPIV3
solates from SCT recipients suggested that even dur-
ng the periods of low incidence that followed our
asily recognizable outbreak, nosocomial transmission
f the virus continued to occur. Further studies to
elineate the mechanism of transmission in this set-
ing are clearly needed and should probably focus on
ssues of environmental contamination or asymptom-
tic carriage among caregivers or health-care workers.
iven the high morbidity and mortality associated
ith hPIV3 infection in the immunocompromised
ost (and the lack of effective therapeutic options [4]),
revention via infection control remains our primary
eapon. Although more intensive personal protection
such as masks for patients or universal gowns, gloves,
nd masks for patient contact) could be considered, it
s important to recognize that these measures have
B&MTailed to prevent nosocomial transmission at other
enters [5,6] and may be impractical for use in the
utpatient setting. Clearly, the concept of nosocomial
ransmission of community respiratory viruses should
e expanded to include the OPD for the immunocom-
romised host. As more and more transplantations are
erformed in the outpatient setting (such as those
fter nonmyeloablative conditioning), this concept is
ikely to assume increasing importance.
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